日時：2025年4月16日（水）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Shyamal Chowdhury (University of Sydney)　

タイトル：Parental Paternalism and Patience

アブストラクト:Quantitative evidence on the extent of paternalism within families is scant. We provide a novel measure to study whether and how parents interfere paternalistically in their children's intertemporal decision-making. In an experiment with over 2,000 members from 610 families in Bangladesh, we find that more than half of all parents are willing to pay money to override their children's choices in order to mitigate the (correctly anticipated) level of children's present bias. The extent of parental paternalism is strongly related to parenting styles and we discuss how it interacts with the intergenerational transmission of patience.

日時：2025年4月24日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Pei Cheng Yu氏（UNSW）

タイトル：Optimal Retirement Policies with Private Annuities

アブストラクト：This paper examines the optimal design of retirement policies that rely on private insurance markets while accounting for financial frictions within these markets. We analyze the impact of uninsurable aggregate interest rate shocks in a life-cycle model where the government screens productivity, longevity, and altruism. We show that observing retirees' annuitization choices helps separate individual types. However, private annuity markets face supply-side inefficiencies due to interest rate risk. To improve market efficiency, the government can issue long-term bonds, supported by interest rate-contingent taxes. Therefore, full privatization can only be optimal without interest rate shocks; otherwise, Social Security remains necessary.

日時：2025年5月22日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：伊神　満 氏（University of Toronto ）

タイトル："Welfare Gains from Product and Process Innovations: The Case of LCD Panels, 2001-2011"

アブストラクト：We used unusually detailed data on sales, costs, and investments from the global industry of liquid crystal display (LCD) panels to study the welfare consequences of various types of innovation. Product and process innovations account for 70.6% and 38.9% of total welfare, respectively, with substantial heterogeneity between market segments. The social return on technological investments is unambiguously positive, but the private returns for most firms are negligible because of competition. Simulations suggest the industry-wide incentive to innovate tends to increase with seven-to-six and six-to-five mergers, but the effect becomes mostly negative in subsequent consolidation. We conclude with antitrust policy implications.

 日時：2025年5月29日（木）13：30～15：00

 場所：豊中キャンパス　OSIPP棟6階　会議室 

 講師：国本　隆氏（Singapore Management University ）　　

 議題："Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences"

アブストラクト：When the normative goals for a set of agents can be summarized in a set-valued rule and agents take actions that are rationalizable, a new theory of incentives emerges in which standard Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is relaxed significantly. The paper studies the interim rationalizable implementation of social choice sets with a Cartesian product structure, a leading example thereof being ex-post efficiency. Setwise incentive compatibility (setwise IC), much weaker than BIC, is shown to be necessary for implementation. Setwise IC enforces incentives flexibly within the entire correspondence, instead of the pointwise enforcement entailed by BIC. Sufficient conditions, while based on the existence of SCFs in the correspondence that make truthful revelation a dominant strategy, are shown to be permissive to allow the implementation of ex-post efficiency in many settings where equilibrium implementation fails (e.g., bilateral trading, multidimensional signals). Furthermore, this success comes at little cost: all our mechanisms are well behaved, in the sense that best responses always exist.

日時：2025年6月5日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパス法経研究棟1階　eコモンズ

講師：Juan Pantano氏（University of Arizona  ）

タイトル：Stochastic Compliance and Identification of Treatment Effects (joint with Hidehiko Ichimura)

アブストラクト：The exclusion restriction plays a key role in the identification of LATE (Imbens & Angrist (1994), Angrist, Imbens & Rubin (1996)). We discuss a particularly ubiquitous way in which the exclusion restriction would seem to be generically violated. We argue that this form of violation is not addressed in the many applications that rely on this influential framework. We characterize the bias that this particular violation gives rise to and, more constructively, discuss how to use the particular structure of the violation along with milder assumptions and additional data to restore identification. We provide sharper bounds by exploiting the specific structure of the exclusion restriction violation we uncover. Further, with an additional assumption which is plausible in many empirical settings, we restore point identification of LATE. We illustrate with examples and discuss why this violation is likely present in most existing empirical applications. We discuss how our arguments naturally extend to other IV settings where the LATE parameter is commonly invoked, such as randomized controlled trials with imperfect compliance and fuzzy regression discontinuity designs. Moving beyond LATE, we also consider how the same problems and solution ideas apply to identification of the MTE profile and more structural "Roy" models of treatment effects.

日時：2025年6月26日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Ali Bakhtawar 氏(Aix-Marseille Shcool of Economics)

タイトル：Lawfare in Action: Evidence from Anti-Corruption Trails

アブストラクト：The strategic use of the judicial system to target political opponents, under the guise of legal process, known as “lawfare", has become an important concern in understanding the erosion of democratic checks and balances. A central question is whether observed legal actions reflect genuine differences in wrongdoing or the selective deployment of judicial processes for political advantage. Leveraging a regression discontinuity design and data from Pakistan, we provide causal evidence that lawfare exists and is systematically employed to target political rivals. Using a regression discontinuity design and newly assembled data from Pakistan, we provide causal evidence that lawfare systematically targets political rivals. We further show that this strategic use of the justice system undermines its effectiveness by displacing legitimate corruption enforcement, particularly cases involving non-political actors such as career bureaucrats. The evidence further suggests the conditions under which the weaponization of justice is most likely and when it appears to be absent. Overall, the evidence highlights how judicial politicization destabilizes the political order and erodes accountability and legal impartiality.

日時：2025年7月31日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：鈴木　悠太氏（上海交通大学）

タイトル：Living in a Ghost Town: The Geography of Aging and Depopulation (Joint work with Elisa Giannone, Yuhei Miyauchi, Nuno Paixao, and Xinle Pang)

アブストラクト：This paper analyzes the spatial heterogeneity of population aging and decline in Japan, revealing a stark contrast between rapidly aging rural areas and expanding metropolitan regions. Using spatially disaggregated data and a dynamic life-cycle spatial general equilibrium model, we show that depopulation is driven by out-migration and low birth rates, further exacerbated by lower productivity and declining amenities. Our model projects that this unequal spatial trajectory of aging and population decline will persist. The resulting spatial inequality poses a significant challenge for the national government: sustaining local public services in aging areas is essential for the remaining elderly population, yet the required per capita fiscal transfers continue to grow. The findings highlight a fundamental trade-off between efficiency and equity: while population concentration enhances aggregate efficiency, maintaining population dispersion promotes spatial equity.

日時：2025年9月4日（木）13：30～14：50

会場：豊中キャンパス法経研究棟1階　eコモンズ

講師：Zhengfei Yu氏（筑波大学）

タイトル：Semiparametric Bayesian Difference-in-Differences

アブストラクト：This paper develops semiparametric Bayesian methods for estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in difference-in-differences (DiD) designs. We propose two Bayesian procedures with frequentist validity. The first places a Gaussian process prior on the conditional mean function of the control group. The second is a double-robust Bayesian approach that adjusts the prior on the conditional mean function and then corrects the posterior distribution of the ATT. We establish a semiparametric Bernstein–von Mises theorem, showing the asymptotic equivalence between our Bayesian procedures and efficient frequentist estimators. For the second approach, the result holds under double-robust smoothness conditions: the lack of smoothness in the conditional mean function can be compensated by high regularity of the propensity score, and vice versa. Monte Carlo simulations and an empirical application demonstrate strong finite-sample performance of our Bayesian DiD methods. We also extend the framework to staggered DiD designs.