New■2025年度　第1回　大阪大学経済学研究会　のご案内（IPP研究会共催）

日時：2025年4月16日（水）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Shyamal Chowdhury (University of Sydney)　

タイトル：Parental Paternalism and Patience

アブストラクト:Quantitative evidence on the extent of paternalism within families is scant. We provide a novel measure to study whether and how parents interfere paternalistically in their children's intertemporal decision-making. In an experiment with over 2,000 members from 610 families in Bangladesh, we find that more than half of all parents are willing to pay money to override their children's choices in order to mitigate the (correctly anticipated) level of children's present bias. The extent of parental paternalism is strongly related to parenting styles and we discuss how it interacts with the intergenerational transmission of patience.

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Time and Date:  13：30～15：00,Wednesday, April, 16th 

Seminar Venue: The Conference Room 6F OSIPP棟, Toyonaka Campus  

Speaker: Shyamal Chowdhury (University of Sydney)　

Title: Parental Paternalism and Patience

Abstract: Quantitative evidence on the extent of paternalism within families is scant. We provide a novel measure to study whether and how parents interfere paternalistically in their children's intertemporal decision-making. In an experiment with over 2,000 members from 610 families in Bangladesh, we find that more than half of all parents are willing to pay money to override their children's choices in order to mitigate the (correctly anticipated) level of children's present bias. The extent of parental paternalism is strongly related to parenting styles and we discuss how it interacts with the intergenerational transmission of patience.

■今後のスケジュール

日時：2025年4月24日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Pei Cheng Yu氏（UNSW）

タイトル：Optimal Retirement Policies with Private Annuities

アブストラクト：This paper examines the optimal design of retirement policies that rely on private insurance markets while accounting for financial frictions within these markets. We analyze the impact of uninsurable aggregate interest rate shocks in a life-cycle model where the government screens productivity, longevity, and altruism. We show that observing retirees' annuitization choices helps separate individual types. However, private annuity markets face supply-side inefficiencies due to interest rate risk. To improve market efficiency, the government can issue long-term bonds, supported by interest rate-contingent taxes. Therefore, full privatization can only be optimal without interest rate shocks; otherwise, Social Security remains necessary.

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