日時：2025年4月16日（水）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Shyamal Chowdhury (University of Sydney)　

タイトル：Parental Paternalism and Patience

アブストラクト:Quantitative evidence on the extent of paternalism within families is scant. We provide a novel measure to study whether and how parents interfere paternalistically in their children's intertemporal decision-making. In an experiment with over 2,000 members from 610 families in Bangladesh, we find that more than half of all parents are willing to pay money to override their children's choices in order to mitigate the (correctly anticipated) level of children's present bias. The extent of parental paternalism is strongly related to parenting styles and we discuss how it interacts with the intergenerational transmission of patience.

日時：2025年4月24日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Pei Cheng Yu氏（UNSW）

タイトル：Optimal Retirement Policies with Private Annuities

アブストラクト：This paper examines the optimal design of retirement policies that rely on private insurance markets while accounting for financial frictions within these markets. We analyze the impact of uninsurable aggregate interest rate shocks in a life-cycle model where the government screens productivity, longevity, and altruism. We show that observing retirees' annuitization choices helps separate individual types. However, private annuity markets face supply-side inefficiencies due to interest rate risk. To improve market efficiency, the government can issue long-term bonds, supported by interest rate-contingent taxes. Therefore, full privatization can only be optimal without interest rate shocks; otherwise, Social Security remains necessary.

日時：2025年5月22日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：伊神　満 氏（University of Toronto ）

タイトル："Welfare Gains from Product and Process Innovations: The Case of LCD Panels, 2001-2011"

アブストラクト：We used unusually detailed data on sales, costs, and investments from the global industry of liquid crystal display (LCD) panels to study the welfare consequences of various types of innovation. Product and process innovations account for 70.6% and 38.9% of total welfare, respectively, with substantial heterogeneity between market segments. The social return on technological investments is unambiguously positive, but the private returns for most firms are negligible because of competition. Simulations suggest the industry-wide incentive to innovate tends to increase with seven-to-six and six-to-five mergers, but the effect becomes mostly negative in subsequent consolidation. We conclude with antitrust policy implications.

 日時：2025年5月29日（木）13：30～15：00

 場所：豊中キャンパス　OSIPP棟6階　会議室 

 講師：国本　隆氏（Singapore Management University ）　　

 議題："Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences"

アブストラクト：When the normative goals for a set of agents can be summarized in a set-valued rule and agents take actions that are rationalizable, a new theory of incentives emerges in which standard Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is relaxed significantly. The paper studies the interim rationalizable implementation of social choice sets with a Cartesian product structure, a leading example thereof being ex-post efficiency. Setwise incentive compatibility (setwise IC), much weaker than BIC, is shown to be necessary for implementation. Setwise IC enforces incentives flexibly within the entire correspondence, instead of the pointwise enforcement entailed by BIC. Sufficient conditions, while based on the existence of SCFs in the correspondence that make truthful revelation a dominant strategy, are shown to be permissive to allow the implementation of ex-post efficiency in many settings where equilibrium implementation fails (e.g., bilateral trading, multidimensional signals). Furthermore, this success comes at little cost: all our mechanisms are well behaved, in the sense that best responses always exist.

日時：2025年6月5日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパス法経研究棟1階　eコモンズ

講師：Juan Pantano氏（University of Arizona  ）

タイトル：Stochastic Compliance and Identification of Treatment Effects (joint with Hidehiko Ichimura)

アブストラクト：The exclusion restriction plays a key role in the identification of LATE (Imbens & Angrist (1994), Angrist, Imbens & Rubin (1996)). We discuss a particularly ubiquitous way in which the exclusion restriction would seem to be generically violated. We argue that this form of violation is not addressed in the many applications that rely on this influential framework. We characterize the bias that this particular violation gives rise to and, more constructively, discuss how to use the particular structure of the violation along with milder assumptions and additional data to restore identification. We provide sharper bounds by exploiting the specific structure of the exclusion restriction violation we uncover. Further, with an additional assumption which is plausible in many empirical settings, we restore point identification of LATE. We illustrate with examples and discuss why this violation is likely present in most existing empirical applications. We discuss how our arguments naturally extend to other IV settings where the LATE parameter is commonly invoked, such as randomized controlled trials with imperfect compliance and fuzzy regression discontinuity designs. Moving beyond LATE, we also consider how the same problems and solution ideas apply to identification of the MTE profile and more structural "Roy" models of treatment effects.

日時：2025年6月26日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Ali Bakhtawar 氏(Aix-Marseille Shcool of Economics)

タイトル：Lawfare in Action: Evidence from Anti-Corruption Trails

アブストラクト：The strategic use of the judicial system to target political opponents, under the guise of legal process, known as “lawfare", has become an important concern in understanding the erosion of democratic checks and balances. A central question is whether observed legal actions reflect genuine differences in wrongdoing or the selective deployment of judicial processes for political advantage. Leveraging a regression discontinuity design and data from Pakistan, we provide causal evidence that lawfare exists and is systematically employed to target political rivals. Using a regression discontinuity design and newly assembled data from Pakistan, we provide causal evidence that lawfare systematically targets political rivals. We further show that this strategic use of the justice system undermines its effectiveness by displacing legitimate corruption enforcement, particularly cases involving non-political actors such as career bureaucrats. The evidence further suggests the conditions under which the weaponization of justice is most likely and when it appears to be absent. Overall, the evidence highlights how judicial politicization destabilizes the political order and erodes accountability and legal impartiality.

日時：2025年7月31日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：鈴木　悠太氏（上海交通大学）

タイトル：Living in a Ghost Town: The Geography of Aging and Depopulation (Joint work with Elisa Giannone, Yuhei Miyauchi, Nuno Paixao, and Xinle Pang)

アブストラクト：This paper analyzes the spatial heterogeneity of population aging and decline in Japan, revealing a stark contrast between rapidly aging rural areas and expanding metropolitan regions. Using spatially disaggregated data and a dynamic life-cycle spatial general equilibrium model, we show that depopulation is driven by out-migration and low birth rates, further exacerbated by lower productivity and declining amenities. Our model projects that this unequal spatial trajectory of aging and population decline will persist. The resulting spatial inequality poses a significant challenge for the national government: sustaining local public services in aging areas is essential for the remaining elderly population, yet the required per capita fiscal transfers continue to grow. The findings highlight a fundamental trade-off between efficiency and equity: while population concentration enhances aggregate efficiency, maintaining population dispersion promotes spatial equity.

日時：2025年11月6日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパス法経講義棟1階　eコモンズ

講師：Sebastian Seitz 氏 (University of Manchester)

タイトル：The Interaction of Private and Public Disability Insurance: Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Welfare

アブストラクト：I study the interaction between private and public disability insurance (DI). Using comprehensive contract data from a major German insurer combined with representative administrative and survey data, I estimate a dynamic life-cycle model of insurance, savings, and labor supply choices. I find that private DI imposes significant fiscal costs on public DI by increasing public DI claims. As public DI becomes more generous, private DI reduces welfare gains and eventually reduces welfare. Conversely, private DI can offset welfare losses from public cuts, allowing for welfare-enhancing and cost-reducing reforms.

GSE-OSIPP-ISER Joint Conference in Economics 2025】

【日時：2025年9月17・18日（水・木）9：00～12：30　　

Wednesday, September　17:

講師：Takashi Onoda (Japan Bank for International Cooperation) Jingcheng Jiang (University of Tokyo) Kohei Takeda (National University of Singapore) 

Thursday, September 18:　

講師：Yun-Ting Yeh (University of Arizona) Etienne Makdissi (Hitotsubashi University) Hiroki Saruya (Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office) 

プログラム：GSE-OSIPP-ISER Joint Conference in Economics 2025

申込【締め切り9/10】

日時：2025年10月23日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟2階　講義シアター

講師：Dan Han 氏(Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore)

タイトル：Better Together? The Impact of Multi-State Purchasing Pools on Medicaid Drug Spending and Utilization

アブストラクト：We study the effects of multi-state purchasing pools for Medicaid prescription drugs on rebates, drug utilization, and payment rates. These purchasing pools leverage bulk purchasing and preferred drug lists to increase states' bargaining power in negotiating supplemental rebates with drug manufacturers. Since 2003, more than 30 states have joined one of the three Medicaid-focused purchasing pools. Using data from the Medicaid Budget & Expenditure System and State Drug Utilization Data, we find that entering a purchasing pool increases the probability of a state collecting supplemental rebates and the size of those rebates. On the intensive margin, a larger pool size is associated with higher rebate amounts for existing pool members. Purchasing pool participation also increases generic drug utilization while reducing Medicaid payment rates for both brand-name and generic drugs. Taken together, the findings suggest that both combined volume and negotiation, as well as access to pricing information, may be at play in driving these effects.

日時：2025年11月6日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパス法経講義棟1階　eコモンズ

講師：Sebastian Seitz 氏 (University of Manchester)

タイトル：The Interaction of Private and Public Disability Insurance: Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Welfare

アブストラクト：I study the interaction between private and public disability insurance (DI). Using comprehensive contract data from a major German insurer combined with representative administrative and survey data, I estimate a dynamic life-cycle model of insurance, savings, and labor supply choices. I find that private DI imposes significant fiscal costs on public DI by increasing public DI claims. As public DI becomes more generous, private DI reduces welfare gains and eventually reduces welfare. Conversely, private DI can offset welfare losses from public cuts, allowing for welfare-enhancing and cost-reducing reforms.

日時：2025年11月14日（金）10：30～12：00

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Arvind Magesan 氏(University of Calgary)

タイトル：Candidate Selection by Parties: Crime and Politics in India

アブストラクト：We study how parties choose candidates, a key issue to understand political selection and ultimately policy choices. Do parties select candidates that voters like, or are their choices shaped by other considerations? What is the impact of policies that limitparties’ choice sets, such as restrictions on candidates with a criminal history? To study these questions, we combine rich candidate-level data from India with a model in which parties trade off the electoral appeal of candidates against internal party preferences in a strategic game of candidate selection. We find that parties’ preferences systematically deviate from voters’. While parties select candidates who are likely to win, all else equal they prefer those who are not overly popular. Selection decisions are also driven by strategic considerations, as well as factors that are independent of voter preferences, such as the ease of recruiting certain candidates. Our estimates provide a nuanced explanation for parties’ motivation to run criminal candidates, and, through counterfactual simulations, shed light on the potential impacts of banning criminals from contesting elections.

日時：2025年11月27日（木）15：10～17：50

**Mini Workshop on Regulation Practice and Trends**

会場：豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階　会議室

講師：Achim I. Czerny 氏(The Hong Kong Polytechnic University）

　　　Chongwoo Choe 氏（Monash University）

【Achim I. Czerny】

タイトル：On carbon pricing in hard-to-abate sectors such as aviation or maritime industries

アブストラクト：The International Transportation Association (IATA) is an influential global airline association. It claims that green taxes do not incentivize investments in green technology but rather divert money that could be used to green aviation. This paper presents a theoretical study that analyzes the effectiveness of a carbon in the context of a differentiated airline duopoly. The model involves a two-stage game. In the first stage, airlines invest in green technology. In the second stage, airlines compete in prices a la Bertrand. In the case of symmetric airlines, our findings are partly consistent with IATA's claim in the sense that green taxes are less effective than one might expect in incentivizing the environmental transition. The reason is that airlines strategically “underinvest'' in green technology in an attempt to soften competition in the pricing stage. The results are more ambiguous once airline asymmetry is considered. With cost asymmetry, the airline with the relatively high cost might “overinvest'' in green technology to improve its competitive situation vis-à-vis the more cost-effective rival.

【Chongwoo Choe】

タイトル：Privacy regulations, consumer empowerment, and versioning

アブストラクト：Privacy regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation aim to empower consumers with greater transparency and control over their personal data. In response, firms may exercise price discrimination in the form of versioning. This paper studies how these two aspects of privacy regulation—consumer empowerment and versioning—affect market outcomes and welfare. We develop a model where firms earn revenue from sales of service and data monetization, and consumers differ in their preferences for the service and privacy costs incurred when sharing data with the firm. In a monopoly, the firm is better off after regulation because its ability to price discriminate outweighs the effects of increased consumer empowerment. In a duopoly, however, greater consumer choice after regulation intensifies competition, as firms have more ways to deviate from mutually beneficial outcomes. This results in the firm with more data monetization earning smaller profit, while the firm with less data monetization earns larger profit. However, the industry profit as a whole decreases and consumer surplus increases after the regulation. Therefore, the regulation’s impact is nuanced and depends on the market structure. We also examine the regulatory impact on firms’ optimal data-driven revenue models and market entry.