日時：2024年4月5日（金）16時50分～18時50分　

会場: 国際公共政策研究科棟6階会議室　

講師：Asad Islam 氏 (Monash University)

タイトル："Forced Displacement, Mental Health, and Child Development: Evidence from the Rohingya Refugees"

アブストラクト：Forced displacement is a major driver of mental disorders among refugees worldwide. Poor mental health of adult refugees, particularly mothers, is also considered a risk factor for the psychological well-being and development of their children. In this study, we experimentally examine the extent to which a multifaceted psychosocial program improves the mental health of refugee mothers, and facilitates growth and development among children under the age of two. In partnership with BRAC, we ran a cluster randomized controlled trial on 3,500 Rohingya mother-child dyads in refugee camps in Bangladesh. Participants were given weekly psychosocial support for 44 weeks through peer volunteers, which includes psychoeducation and parenting support for mothers and play activities for both mothers and children. The intervention was largely successful and led to: (i) reductions in the psychological trauma and depression severity of mothers and children, (ii) improvements in communication, gross-motor, and problem-solving skills of children, and (iii) reductions in stunting and severe stunting. The intervention cost about $1 per dyad per week and is currently being scaled up in refugee camps in Bangladesh, where about seventeen thousand mother-child pairs now benefit from it.

日時：2024年5月23日（木）13時30分～15時00分　

会場: 国際公共政策研究科棟6階会議室　

講師：Shurojit Chatterji氏（Singapore Management University）

タイトル："Efficiency with Heterogenous forecasts"

アブストラクト：Do price forecasts of rational economic agents need to coincide in intertemporal perfectly competitive complete markets in order for markets to allocate resources efficiently? Recent work in a two-period model with a nominal bond has shown that there is a one dimensional set of efficient allocations for generic endowments that can be sustained by heterogenous forecasts. Moreover, these efficient allocations can be supported by forecasts that disagree up to one degree of freedom. Thus, strong as efficiency and perfect competition may appear, they do not imply perfect foresight, but they do add explanatory power to temporary equilibrium, since they select a small subset out of the Pareto efficient allocations, which generally have higher dimension. We next study a muti-period model with a nominal bond that matures in one period and identify the set of efficient allocations that can be sustained as Walrasian equilibria with heterogenous forecasts. We then add a long maturity bond, which under perfect foresight would be a redundant asset, and show that it fundamentally expands the set of efficient allocations that can be sustained as Walrasian equilibria. Indeed all wealth transfers compatible with efficiency can arise endogenously. The key feature driving this conclusion are forecasting errors, which lead to ex post arbitrage opportunities that induce these income transfers.

日時：2024年5月30日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス国際公共政策研究科6階会議室

講師：小西　秀男氏（Boston College）

タイトル："Competing Teams in Large Markets: Free Entry Equilibrium with (Sub-)Optimal Contracts"

アブストラクト：In this paper, we formalize a market with a large number of competing production teams following Alchian and Demsetz (1974). We allow for wide-spread externalities which can affect players’ payoffs. These externalities include changes in market conditions and pollutions, and may generate a variety of equilibrium outcomes. There are finite types of atomless players, who can form team-firms with finite memberships using available technologies. Given an arbitrary set of feasible partnership contracts for each team type, we consider free entry equilibrium as our equilibrium concept in a free entry equilibrium, no team type can attract its members from other teams by proposing any implementable partnership contract. Furthermore, in a free entry equilibrium, players of the same type may have different payoffs unequal treatment of equals. We show that as long as each firm type’s implementable payoff set is compact and continuous in externality variables, there exists a free entry equilibrium. We provide several applications of our results.

日時：2024年6月6日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパス国際公共政策研究科6階会議室

講師：Hyunseok Jung氏（University of Arkansas）　

タイトル："Testing for Peer Effects without Specifying the Network Structure"

アブストラクト：This paper proposes an Anderson-Rubin (AR) test for the presence of peer effects in panel data without the need to specify the network structure.The unrestricted model of our test is a linear panel data model of social interactions with dyad-specific peer effects. The proposed AR test evaluates if the peer effect coefficients are all zero. As the number of peer effect coefficients increases with the sample size, so does the number of instrumental variables (IVs) employed to test the restrictions under the null, rendering Bekker’s many-IV environment. By extending existing many-IV asymptotic results to panel data, we establish the asymptotic validity of the proposed AR test. Our Monte Carlo simulations show the robustness and superior performance of the proposed test compared to some existing tests with misspecified networks. We provide two applications to demonstrate its empirical relevance. 

日時：2024年6月27日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパス国際公共政策研究科6階会議室

講師：佐野　隆司氏（横浜国立大学）

タイトル："Beyond Quasilinearity: Exploring Nonlinear Scoring Rules in Procurement Auctions "

(joint with Makoto Hanazono, Jun Nakabayashi, and Masanori Tsuruoka)

アブストラクト：This study examines procurement auctions in which bidders submit price and quality, and they are evaluated using the price-per-quality-ratio scoring rule. We formulate a model of scoring auctions in which bidders’ cost is determined by unidimensional type and unidimensional quality. We characterize the equilibrium bidding behavior for the first-score and second-score auctions. In contrast to the well-known quasilinear scoring rules in which price and quality are additively separable and score is linear in price, the equivalence theorem does not hold between the auction formats. We show that the second-score auction yields a lower (better) expected score than the first-score auction. We provide a set of conditions under which the expected quality and price are higher in the first-score auction than in the second-score auction. We also argue how these results can be extended to other non-quasilinear scoring rules.

【マクロ研共催セミナー】

日時：2024年7月19日（金）13:30～16:50

会場：豊中キャンパス法経研究棟7階　大会議室

【13:30-15:00】

講師：稲垣　一真氏（ロチェスター大学）

タイトル： "The Exporter and Productivity Dynamics: The Effect of Trade Liberalization"

アブストラクト：This paper studies how R&D and export investment magnifies the welfare gain from trade liberalization. I develop a dynamic heterogeneous firm international trade model with investment in productivity-enhanced R&D and export technology. I find that the R&D with a dynamic export technology enhances the welfare gain from trade liberalization, in contrast to the canonical model with static firms' export decisions. I quantitatively demonstrate that the welfare gain from trade liberalization of the model with R&D is higher than that without R&D by 40%, compared to 2% at a static export model. These findings suggest that static trade models are an even worse approximation of dynamic trade models than we thought.

【15:20-16:50 】

講師：保里　俊介氏（一橋大学）

タイトル："Quarantine and Its Scar on Labor "

アブストラクト：TBA

日時：2024年７月25日（木）13:30～16：40

会場：豊中キャンパス法経研究棟1階　eコモンズ

【13：30～15：00】

講師：土居　直史氏（小樽商科大学）

タイトル："Optimizing Multiple Airport Charges with Endogenous Airline Quality Considering the Marginal Cost of Public Funds"

アブストラクト：Airport operation costs are financed by charge revenues from airport users and funds transferred from general government funds. This study quantitatively optimizes the rates of three types of airport-related charges: per-passenger charges (e.g., passenger service facility charges), per-flight charges (e.g., landing fees), and aviation fuel tax, explicitly considering the marginal cost of public funds of the general funds. This study uses a route-level empirical structural model in which airlines with market power set both airfares and service quality (i.e., flight frequency). Our results show that it is optimal to increase the transfer from the general funds from the current amount and that the optimization increases social welfare by 19 percent. Even if the amount of the transfer is fixed at the current level, the social welfare can be increased by 10 percent only by adjusting the current rates of the airport-related charges. In particular, we show that charges should be adjusted so as to increase flight frequency on routes where small aircraft are used.

【15:10～16：40】

講師：守屋　隆弘氏（Stony Brook University）　

タイトル："Communication Technology Advance and Consequences: Using Two-sided Search Model"

アブストラクト：Does communication technology advance, such as online dating sites and social networking services, really make us happier? In this paper, I construct a non-stationary two-sided search market equilibrium model to analyze the quantitative effects of the communication technology advance on individuals’ marital behavior and social welfare. In the model, I include cohabitation as well as marriage as an individual choice, and provide a new  identification argument for separately identifying parameters that have been considered important but difficult to identify, with new proof of the existence of the non-stationary market equilibrium. Using the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, I quantify the effects of the communication technology advance on society and reveal which types of individuals benefit from it.

日時：2024年8月1日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパス　法経研究棟7階　大会議室

講師：能勢　学氏（IMF）

タイトル："From Battlefield to Marketplace: Industrialization via Interregional Highway Investment in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region"

アブストラクト：This paper evaluates non-linear impact of a large-scale highway construction project in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region, linking the mountainous China-Vietnam borders to industrial centers in northeastern Vietnam. Employing the market access approach alongside geo-coded highway network and firm-level panel data, we estimate the effects of the highway upgrades, accounting for their spillover impact through production input-output linkages. Exploiting variations in geographic conditions, our findings reveal that enhanced market potential has led to the agglomeration of manufacturing firms in both core and peripheral cities, accompanied by significant creation of manufacturing employment in rural peripheries. The paper delves into the underlying mechanism driving polycentric development patterns, highlighting pronounced GMS treatment effects in second-tier cities with intermediate production linkages and connections to major national roads. The overall findings remain robust when the impact of Vietnam’s industrial zones is controlled, underscoring that the upgraded highway connectivity has played a pivotal role in facilitating economy-wide industrialization over the decade.

【GSE-OSIPP-ISER Joint Conference in Economics 2024】

日時：2024年9月24・25日（火・水）9：00～12：30　　

Tuesday, September 24:

講師：Kohei Yata (University of Wisconsin-Madison) Koki Fusejima (Hitotsubashi University) Shoya Ishimaru (Hitotsubashi University)

Wednesday, September 25:　

講師：Yasutaka Koike-Mori (UCLA) Yoshiki Ando (Boston University) Young In Lee (Hokkaido University)

プログラム：GSE-OSIPP-ISER Joint Conference in Economics 2024

申込【締め切り9/18】

日時：2024年10月3日（木）13：30～15：00

会場：豊中キャンパス法経講義棟eコモンズ

講師：Tsung-Hsien Li氏 (Academia Sinica)

タイトル："Air Connectivity and International Travel: Evidence from Cross-border Card Payments"

アブストラクト：Many countries seek to attract foreign travelers. How do direct flight connections affect the spending of international visitors? A novel dataset on card payments made by Chinese travelers enables us to investigate that question. We instrument for the frequency of direct flights between Chinese cities and foreign countries by exploiting overseas airport expansions as exogenous shocks. Our estimate suggests that in a city with the average frequency, adding one extra weekly direct flight increases the transaction value by 52%. While improving air connectivity promotes travel, we find that negative shocks to consumer preferences diminish the positive impact of air connectivity.