大阪大学経済学研究会
GSE-OSIPP joint seminars in economics
IPP研究会共催
NEW■2023年度 第4回 大阪大学経済学研究会 のご案内
日時：2023年6月14日（水）16：50～18：20
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
講師：飯島 良太 氏（Yale University ）
タイトル："Monitoring with Rich Data" (with Mira Frick and Yuhta Ishii)
アブストラクト：We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich data about an agent's action. We characterize the optimal rate at which the principal can achieve the first-best payoff as the amount of data grows large. Our results suggest a novel rationale for the widely observed
binary-payment contracts, by showing that such simple contracts can achieve the optimal convergence rate. In contrast, contracts that display rich wage variation (e.g., linear contracts) approximate the first-best at a highly suboptimal rate. Our analysis also yields a robust ranking over monitoring
technologies that does not require the principal to know the agent's specific utility function. We discuss how this ranking sheds light on the difference between comparing information structures for incentive provision vs.\ learning.
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DATE: June 14（Wednesday) 16：50～18：20
Seminar Venue: The Conference Room on the 7th floor of Graduate School of Economics (法経研究棟）in Toyonaka Campus
Speaker: Ryota Iijima 氏 (Yale University)
Title: "Monitoring with Rich Data" (with Mira Frick and Yuhta Ishii)
Abstract: We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich data about an agent's action. We characterize the optimal rate at which the principal can achieve the first-best payoff as the amount of data grows large. Our results suggest a novel rationale for the widely observed
binary-payment contracts, by showing that such simple contracts can achieve the optimal convergence rate. In contrast, contracts that display rich wage variation (e.g., linear contracts) approximate the first-best at a highly suboptimal rate. Our analysis also yields a robust ranking over monitoring
technologies that does not require the principal to know the agent's specific utility function. We discuss how this ranking sheds light on the difference between comparing information structures for incentive provision vs.\ learning.
■今後のスケジュール
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日時：2023年6月22日（木）13：30～15：00
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
講師：Bruno Strulovici氏（Northwestern University）
DATE: June 22（Thursday) 13：30～15：00
Seminar Venue: The Conference Room on the 7th floor of Graduate School of Economics (法経研究棟）in Toyonaka Campus
Speaker: Bruno Strulovici氏 (Northwestern University）
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日時：2023年6月29日（木）13：30～15：00
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
講師：相澤 直貴氏（University of Wisconsin）
DATE: June 29（Thursday) 13：30～15：00
Seminar Venue: The Conference Room on the 7th floor of Graduate School of Economics (法経研究棟）in Toyonaka Campus
Speaker: Naoki Aizawa氏 (Northwestern University）
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日時：2023年7月14日（木）13：30～15：00
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
講師：Robert Chirinko 氏（University of Illinois Chicago）
DATE: July 14（Thursday) 13：30～15：00
Seminar Venue: The Conference Room on the 7th floor of Graduate School of Economics (法経研究棟）in Toyonaka Campus
Speaker: Robert Chirinko 氏 (University of Illinois Chicago）
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日時：2023年10月5日（木）13：30～15：00
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
講師：若森 直樹 氏（一橋大学）
DATE: October 5（Thursday) 13：30～15：00
Seminar Venue: The Conference Room on the 7th floor of Graduate School of Economics (法経研究棟）in Toyonaka Campus
Speaker: Naoki Wakamori 氏 (Hitotsubashi University)
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日時：2023年10月26日（木）16：50～18：20
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
講師：横尾 英史 氏（一橋大学）
DATE: October 5（Thursday) 16：50～18：20
Seminar Venue: The Conference Room on the 7th floor of Graduate School of Economics (法経研究棟）in Toyonaka Campus
Speaker: Hidefumi Yokoo 氏 (Hitotsubashi University)
■2023年度過去のセミナー
第1回 大阪大学経済学研究会
日時：2023年4月27日（木）13：30～15：00/15：10～16：40
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
13：30～15：00
講師： Sultan Mehmood 氏 (New Economic School)
タイトル：Contract Enforcement in a Stateless Economy
アブストラクト：How do markets flourish in the absence of a formal State authority enforcing contracts. To study contract enforcement without the State, we focus on a large informal market: illegal gambling. We present evidence that even in the absence of legal enforcement authority, personal relationships, and violence, more than 70% of gamblers fulfill their contractual obligations in this informal economy. We provide experimental evidence that even in impersonal and informal markets, reputation plays a key role in the honoring of contractual obligations. Extensions of the payment deadline also increases contract enforcement. Overall, we provide data and causal evidence that contract enforcement is possible in impersonal markets and without formal legal enforcement. Illegal gambling thrives on the same principles of reputation and credit constraints that sustain modern legal markets.
報告論文：<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ogzyxZYkMdRIIUUHVOApuLcRWLrSvT80/view>
15：10～16：40
講師： 菊池 信之介氏 (マサチューセッツ工科大学)（慶應義塾大学）
タイトル：Automation and Comparative Advantage
アブストラクト：I study how automation affects comparative advantage. In the past centuries, the initial stages of economic development featured comparative advantage in low-skill-intensive sectors due to low-skill-labor abundance, as predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. I show, however, that this relationship has weakened—or even reversed—in the 21st century. This decoupling/reversal occurs because automation provides developed countries with endogenous comparative advantage in low-skill-intensive sectors. My counterfactual analysis shows that recent developing countries would have specialized in low-skill intensive sectors and enjoyed more gains from trade, as East Asian countries did, without automation in developed countries.
第2回 大阪大学経済学研究会
日時：2023年5月27日（木）13：30～15：00
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
講師：石原 章史 氏 (東京大学)
タイトル：Managing Consultation for Money
アブストラクト：We investigate a model of an expert and a decision maker, where the expert sends cheap-talk messages and monetary transfers. By ignoring advice, the decision maker can induce the expert to pay transfers as costly signalling. Consequently, equilibria such that information is fully revealed are not optimal for the decision maker, even if the parties have a common interest. Furthermore, a conflict of interest is preferable for the decision maker since the expert's signalling incentive through monetary transfers is enhanced.
第3回 大阪大学経済学研究会
日時：2023年6月1日（木）13：30～15：00
会場：豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 大会議室
講師： 田中 聡史氏 (University of Queensland)
タイトル：College Majors and Labour Market Mismatch
アブストラクト：This paper studies the extent of skill mismatch across college major-occupation combinations. We propose a general equilibrium framework to measure mismatch through output loss. The model relies on the estimation of college-occupation returns based on the Roy model. Using Australian administrative tax panel data merging employment history and university degree information, we find sizeable output losses, up to 13.3 percent, from workers allocating to occupations not well linked to their majors. Our results suggest that (1) Commerce and STEM-related fields (IT and Engineering) are the main drivers of mismatch, and (2) government education subsidies broadly increasing college attendance exacerbated mismatch, increasing output loss by up to 8.8 percent, and heightening the persistence of mismatch over the life cycle.
■その他セミナー
