日時：2023年4月27日（木）13：30～15：00/15：10～16：40　

会場：豊中キャンパス　法経研究棟7階　大会議室

13：30～15：00

講師：　Sultan Mehmood 氏　(New Economic School)

タイトル：Contract Enforcement in a Stateless Economy

アブストラクト：How do markets flourish in the absence of a formal State authority enforcing contracts. To study contract enforcement without the State, we focus on a large informal market: illegal gambling. We present evidence that even in the absence of legal enforcement authority, personal relationships, and violence, more than 70% of gamblers fulfill their contractual obligations in this informal economy. We provide experimental evidence that even in impersonal and informal markets, reputation plays a key role in the honoring of contractual obligations. Extensions of the payment deadline also increases contract enforcement. Overall, we provide data and causal evidence that contract enforcement is possible in impersonal markets and without formal legal enforcement. Illegal gambling thrives on the same principles of reputation and credit constraints that sustain modern legal markets.

報告論文：<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ogzyxZYkMdRIIUUHVOApuLcRWLrSvT80/view>

15：10～16：40　

講師：　菊池 信之介氏　(マサチューセッツ工科大学)（慶應義塾大学）

タイトル：Automation and Comparative Advantage

アブストラクト：I study how automation affects comparative advantage. In the past centuries, the initial stages of economic development featured comparative advantage in low-skill-intensive sectors due to low-skill-labor abundance, as predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. I show, however, that this relationship has weakened—or even reversed—in the 21st century. This decoupling/reversal occurs because automation provides developed countries with endogenous comparative advantage in low-skill-intensive sectors. My counterfactual analysis shows that recent developing countries would have specialized in low-skill intensive sectors and enjoyed more gains from trade, as East Asian countries did, without automation in developed countries.

日時：2023年5月27日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　法経研究棟7階　大会議室

講師：石原　章史 氏　(東京大学) 

タイトル：Managing Consultation for Money

アブストラクト：We investigate a model of an expert and a decision maker, where the expert sends cheap-talk messages and monetary transfers. By ignoring advice, the decision maker can induce the expert to pay transfers as costly signalling. Consequently, equilibria such that information is fully revealed are not optimal for the decision maker, even if the parties have a common interest. Furthermore, a conflict of interest is preferable for the decision maker since the expert's signalling incentive through monetary transfers is enhanced.

日時：2023年6月1日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　法経研究棟7階　大会議室

講師： 田中　聡史氏　(University of Queensland) 

タイトル：College Majors and Labour Market Mismatch

アブストラクト：This paper studies the extent of skill mismatch across college major-occupation combinations. We propose a general equilibrium framework to measure mismatch through output loss. The model relies on the estimation of college-occupation returns based on the Roy model. Using Australian administrative tax panel data merging employment history and university degree information, we find sizeable output losses, up to 13.3 percent, from workers allocating to occupations not well linked to their majors. Our results suggest that (1) Commerce and STEM-related fields (IT and Engineering) are the main drivers of mismatch, and (2) government education subsidies broadly increasing college attendance exacerbated mismatch, increasing output loss by up to 8.8 percent, and heightening the persistence of mismatch over the life cycle.

日時：2023年6月14日（水）16：50～18：20　

会場：豊中キャンパス　法経研究棟7階　大会議室

講師：飯島　良太 氏（Yale University ）

タイトル："Monitoring with Rich Data" (with Mira Frick and Yuhta Ishii)

アブストラクト：We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich data about an agent's action. We characterize the optimal rate at which the principal can achieve the first-best payoff as the amount of data grows large. Our results suggest a novel rationale for the widely observed binary-payment contracts, by showing that such simple contracts can achieve the optimal convergence rate. In contrast, contracts that display rich wage variation (e.g., linear contracts) approximate the first-best at a highly suboptimal rate. Our analysis also yields a robust ranking over monitoring technologies that does not require the principal to know the agent's specific utility function. We discuss how this ranking sheds light on the difference between comparing information structures for incentive provision vs.\ learning.

論文

日時：2023年6月22日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　国際公共政策研究科棟　6階会議室 

講師：Bruno Strulovici 氏（Northwestern University） 

タイトル："Robust Implementation with Costly Information" 

アブストラクト：We design mechanisms that robustly implement any desired social choice function when (i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state of the world, (ii) with small probability, agents’ preferences can be arbitrarily different from some baseline known to the social planner, and (iii) the planner does not know agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another’s preferences. The mechanisms we propose have a natural interpretation, and are robust to trembles in agents’ reporting strategies, to the introduction of a small amount of noise affecting agents’ signals about the state, and to uncertainty concerning the state distribution and agents’ prior beliefs about the state. We also establish impossibility results for stronger notions of robust implementation.

論文

日時：2023年6月29日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　国際公共政策研究科棟　6階会議室 

講師：相澤　直貴氏（University of Wisconsin）

タイトル："Firm Accommodation and the Design of Social Insurance"

アブストラクト：This paper studies the labor market impacts of firm accommodation decisions in response to worker productivity shocks and assesses the role of firms in the design of social insurance programs. Our empirical context is workplace disability, where we leverage detailed administrative data about workplace disability, firm accommodation, and wages from a workers’ compensation program in Oregon that provides wage subsidies to firms for workplace accommodation. Exploiting a policy change to the wage subsidy, we find that a 5 percentage point decrease in the wage subsidy rate led to a significant decrease in accommodation and corresponding negative effects on employment and earnings. To interpret these findings, we develop a frictional labor market model with workplace disability and firm accommodation in which accommodation affects the future productivity of injured workers. Worker turnover and imperfect experience rating can lead to under-accommodation and inefficient labor market outcomes after workplace disability. We identify and structurally estimate our model by exploiting our estimates based on wage subsidy changes. Counterfactual analyses show that a wage subsidy of 40% maximizes overall worker welfare.

日時：2023年7月14日（金）10：30～12：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　法経講義棟　１番講義室

講師：Robert Chirinko 氏（University of Illinois Chicago）

タイトル：The Return On Private Capital Across Countries: Rising And Diverging

アブストラクト：Across 88 countries for 1970-2014, the return on private capital (ROKP) has exhibited two phases, approximately constant from 1970-1990, but then rising dramatically from 1991-2014. This latter increase occurs for both Rich/Developed and Poor/Developing countries, though at an uneven pace; the Lucas Paradox seems to have become more pronounced in recent years. Despite falling real interest rates lowering ROKP’s, 60% [163%] of the secular rise in ROKP,POOR [ROKP,RICH] is explained by rising equity risk, depreciation, and markups and by the capital loss from expected decreases in the relative price of new capital. Policy implications are discussed.

論文

日時：2023年9月20日（水）9：00～12：30　15：30～19：00　

講師：Atsushi Yamagishi (Princeton University) Takanao Tanaka (University of California, Berkeley)

　　  Rie Muraoka (Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Science) Yuta Yasui (Kochi University of Technology)  

  Yuki Tamura (NYU Abu Dhabi)  Satoshi Fukuda (Bocconi University) 

プログラム：GSE-OSIPP-ISER Joint Conference in Economics 2023

申込みサイト：https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/event/conf/

日時：2023年10月5日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　国際公共政策研究科棟6階　会議室 

講師：若森　直樹 氏（一橋大学）

タイトル：New Technology Diffusion: Implications for Estimated Monopsony Power, Markups, and Labor Share

アブストラクト：This paper investigates the potential implications of ignoring heterogeneity in production technology at each plant on estimated monopsony power and markups. We collect plant-level data where we directly observe the types of production technology during new technology diffusion. We  demonstrate that estimating a common production function for all plants results in upward trends in both monopsony power, measured by the differences in growth rates of MRPL and wages, and markups, obtained by production approach. However, accounting for production technology in the analysis eliminates these upward trends, highlighting the importance of controlling for heterogeneity in production technology even within a narrowly-defined industry.

日時：2023年10月26日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　国際公共政策研究科棟6階　会議室 

講師：横尾　英史 氏（一橋大学）

タイトル：Subjective expectations and simulated risks of climate change: Evidence from wineries in Japan

アブストラクト：This study investigates producers' subjective expectations on the risk of damage due to climate change to design information provision policies. We surveyed 214 Japanese wineries in 2022 regarding their perceived risk of negative effects of climate change on future grape production. The issue of this study is deterioration in skin color of black grapes from 2030 to 2050. Our survey elicited probability distributions that could be interpreted as respondents' expectations of and confidence in their projections. We then compared each respondent's subjective expectations to risk estimates predicted by a simulation study conducted by the National Agriculture and Food Research Organization, Japan. The regression analysis shows the characteristics of wineries that underestimate or overestimate the risk. We further estimate the subjective risk belief function of the sample wineries. Based on the results of the analysis, we discuss under what circumstances and to whom the government should provide climate change risk information.

日時：2023年11月16日（木）16：30～18：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　法経研究棟７階 　大会議室

講師：Michael Keen 氏（Tokyo College, University of Tokyo; Former Deputy Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF)

タイトル：Pareto improving minimum taxation

アブストラクト：The international agreement on a minimum effective corporate tax rate, implementation of which is imminent, marks a profound change in global tax arrangements. The appropriate level of that minimum, however, has been, and remains, extremely contentious. This paper explores the strategic responses to a minimum tax, which--the policy objective being to change the rules of the tax competition game--are critical for assessing the design and welfare impact of this fundamental policy innovation. Analysis and calibration plausibly suggest sizable scope for minima that are Pareto-improving, benefiting low tax countries as well as high, relative to the uncoordinated equilibrium.

日時：2023年11月27日（月）15：10～16：40　

会場：豊中キャンパス　国際公共政策研究科棟6階　会議室 

講師：Marianne Baxter 氏（Boston University)

タイトル: New Low Price! An Analysis of IKEA Pricing

アブストラクト：IKEA is a multinational retailer of home furnishings. The dominant feature of IKEA advertising and market image is a reputation for low prices. IKEA’s iconic catalog was the company’s primary advertising vehicle, representing 70% of IKEA’s annual advertising budget (the catalog production was suspended in 2020). The catalog contains photos, prices, and written descriptions of items, with prices denominated in the customer’s currency. IKEA prices are famous for remaining unchanged for the life of the catalog year. The IKEA data are free of two major problems that arise in other micropricing studies: product substitution and temporary sales. This paper analyzes IKEA catalog price data for Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, UK, US and Canada. We find a substantial proportion of small price changes, as is common in micro price datasets, but we find that small price changes are overwhelmingly associated with the practice of “charm pricing”–adjusting ending digits to end in the numeral “9”, with price changes less than one currency unit. Both intensive and extensive margins are important contributors to overall IKEA catalog price changes, in contrast to the prior literature which finds that only the intensive margin is important. We find near-zero pass-through of exchange rates to IKEA prices but approximately 100% pass-through of local prices, which is consistent with the illustrative model that we present that predicts this pattern for goods with a high component of local distribution costs. Our most novel results concern price coordination. IKEA price changes show low coordination across countries, even among countries in the Euro Zone. For example, prices for identical goods are no more likely to move together between Germany and France than between Sweden and Canada. We find evidence of significant price coordination with goods belonging to a product family such as the “BILLY” bookcases. However, the price coordination exists only within countries and not across countries. These facts suggest that there may be economies of scope in price setting as suggested by Midrigan (2011), but that these economies operate at the family level of goods and do not operate across countries.

論文

日時：2024年1月25日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場：豊中キャンパス　国際公共政策研究科棟6階　会議室 

講師：足立　大輔 氏（Aarhus University）

タイトル: "When Work is Threatened: Lifelong Education and Occupation Choice"

アブストラクト：We study the role of adult apprenticeship in occupational switch and labor market dynamics using matched Danish adult and continuing education register and employer-employee data. A dynamic difference-in-difference analysis reveals that workers enrolled in apprenticeships related to business service (BS) occupations exhibit a 1-3 percentage point higher likelihood of transitioning to BS roles within 1-10 years, compared to non-participants. We propose a life-cycle model of employment and education choices that yields a logit conditional choice probability with flexible elasticities of substitution between occupations and education programs. The estimated education take-up elasticity is lower than that of job switching, suggesting a relative insensitivity of individuals to the program attractiveness. Counterfactual analysis indicates that enhancing the attractiveness of BS programs could modestly substitute the take-up of other programs with BS programs, along with striking churning effects on switches from traditional industrial jobs to BS occupations. These findings underscore the potential benefits of adult education initiatives that effectively address the recent changes in labor markets, such as automation and globalization.

日時：2024年１月26日（金）13：30～14：30

会場：豊中キャンパス法経研究棟509セミナー室

講師：Di Feng 氏（Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute）

タイトル：Informative Simplicity in Economics Design

アブストラクト： This paper introduces informative simplicity to economics design, a concept that extends the idea of informational size (Mount and Reiter, 1974). This concept measures a mechanism's simplicity based on the minimum information for its operation. We apply this concept to both matching markets and auctions, yielding significant insights. This study aids in understanding and designing mechanisms by emphasizing the least amount of information needed for effective operation, thereby enhancing their credibility, auditability, and privacy protection. It offers a fresh perspective on evaluating mechanism complexity, steering economics design towards more transparent and efficient systems.

日時：2024年2月1日（木）13：30～15：00　

会場: 豊中キャンパス　国際公共政策研究科棟6階　会議室

講師：Xavier Ragot 氏 (Sciences Po Paris )

タイトル："Redistribution and the wage-price dynamics: Optimal fiscal and monetary policy"

アブストラクト：When both prices and wages are subject to nominal frictions, an increase in input prices such as energy can initiate a wage-price dynamics, as both nominal wages and prices adjust slowly. High inflation in prices and wages reduces welfare as it generates distributional effects and affects aggregate demand. To analyze optimal policy in this environment, we consider a heterogeneous-agent model, with both wage and price stickiness. We derive joint optimal fiscal-monetary policy, using a rich set of fiscal tools. We first identify the set of fiscal tools, which implements nominal price and wage stability as an optimal outcome. Starting from this equivalence result, we identify the key instrument for implementing price and wage stability, which appears to be a time-varying wage subsidy. We call this policy a non-Keynesian stabilization policy, as it does not directly channel through aggregate demand. We finally compare our results to those obtained in a representative-agent environment.

日時：2024年3月6日（水）13：30～15：00　

会場: 豊中キャンパス　国際公共政策研究科棟6階　会議室

講師：高橋　資哲　氏（University of Mainz）

タイトル：The Aggregate Effects of the Great Black Migration 

アブストラクト：In the United States, four million African Americans migrated from the South to the North between 1940 and 1970. How did this great Black migration impact aggregate US output and the welfare of African Americans and others? To answer this question, I quantify an overlapping generations model of the spatial economy in which cohorts of African Americans and others migrate across states. I compare the baseline equilibrium matched with US data from 1940 to 2010 with counterfactual equilibria in which African Americans or others cannot relocate across the North and the South between 1940 and 1970. The mobility of African Americans and others increased aggregate output by 0.7 and 0.3 percent, respectively. Although African Americans accounted for about 10 percent of the US population, their relocation impacted the aggregate economy more than the relocation of the other 90 percent did. The mobility of African Americans induced a large increase in the welfare of African Americans in the South, a small decrease in the welfare of African Americans in the North, and little change in the welfare of others.